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1962] RECENT DECISIONS 1015 
LABOR LAW-UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION-APPLICABLE DISQUALIFI-
CATION PROVISION WHERE CLAIMANT Is DISCHARGED FOR UNAUTHORIZED 
WALKOUT-Plaintiff was discharged by his employer for participating in 
a walkout which was not authorized by the union of which he was a 
member and which was in violation of the applicable collective bargaining 
agreement. In passing upon his subsequent application for unemployment 
compensation, the Appeal Board ruled that he was disqualified from re-
ceiving benefits for the duration of his unemployment because his actions 
had constituted "misconduct" under section 29(1)(a)(2) of the Michigan 
Employment Security Act.1 The circuit court reversed, holding that the 
"misconduct" provision did not apply and that plaintiffs acts were prop-
erly cognizable under section 29(1)(b)2 which provides for disqualification 
from benefits only for the duration of the "labor dispute" in which a 
claimant is engaged. On appeal, held, affirmed, two justices dissenting. 
Where a claimant is discharged for "labor dispute" activities which vio-
late a collective bargaining agreement, the "labor disputes" section of the 
Employment Security Act governs rather than the "misconduct" section. 
Lillard v. Employment Security Comm'n, 364 Mich. 401, 110 N.W.2d 910 
(1961). 
The purpose of the Michigan Employment Security Act is to provide 
economic security for persons unemployed through no fault of their own.3 
This objective is accomplished by requiring an employer to contribute to 
trust accounts4 from which funds are distributed to those prior employees 
of his who qualify under the provisions of the act.5 The amount of an 
employer's contribution is dependent upon the depletion of his account 
through claim payment;6 thus, he is very interested in insuring that no 
claimant receives benefits to which he is not entitled. An individual other-
wise qualified to receive benefits will be disqualified if he is validly dis-
charged for "misconduct" or if his unemployment is due to a "labor dis-
pute."7 A discharge for "misconduct" imposes a disqualification for the 
duration of the unemployment, whereas one resulting from participation 
in a "labor dispute" disqualifies only for the weeks in which there was a 
resulting stoppage of work.8 "Misconduct" involves an intentional and 
substantial disregard of the standards of behavior which the employer has 
a right to expect of his employee,9 contemplating more than mere negli-
1 MICH. COMP. LAws § 421.29(l)(a)(2) (Supp. 1956). 
2 MICH. COMP. LAws § 421.29(l)(b) (Supp. 1956). 
3 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 502 (1960). 
4 MICH. COMP. LAws § 421.10 (Supp. 1956). 
5 MICH. COMP. LAws § 421.28 (Supp. 1956). 
6 MICH. Co:1-n>. LAws §§ 421.13, .19 (Supp. 1956). 
7 MICH. CoMP. LAws § 421.29 (Supp. 1956). 
s MICH. COMP. LAws § 421.29 (Supp. 1956). 
9 Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 260, 296 N.W. 636, 640 (1941). The 
courts in Michigan, as well as in many other jurisdictions, accept the definition of 
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gence or substandard conduct,10 and must be connected with the em-
ployee's work.11 Because of its serious ramifications, substantial evidence 
must be adduced to support its allegation, with the burden of proof being 
on the employer.12 Violation of company rules, frequent absences or tardi-
ness, insubordination, and dishonesty have been held to constitute "mis-
conduct."13 No uniform definition of a "labor dispute"14 has been devel-
oped, but in general the term includes a walkout or stoppage of work 
incident to a controversy between an employer and his employees regarding 
matters connected with the employment.15 
It can easily be recognized that there is no inherent conceptual incon-
sistency between finding that the actions of an employee engaged in a 
"labor dispute" also constituted "misconduct." Thus an employee who 
leaves his job without permission, refuses to take orders, or is insubordi-
nate, all of which are often involved in a "labor dispute," has gener-
ally been held guilty of "misconduct."16 Even before the principal case, 
however, the Michigan Supreme Court, in overruling a prior decision,17 
held that an employee's participation in an unauthorized walkout in vio-
lation of a collective bargaining agreement was not "misconduct."18 In 
justifying this conclusion the court asserted that it was not the proper 
function of the court to review the merits of a "labor dispute" in an un-
employment compensation case, and that such a review would be neces-
sary to determine whether the employee's actions involved "misconduct."19 
It further stressed the fact that the penalty of discharge provided for in 
the collective bargaining agreement had been applied and that it would 
not impose the additional penalty of a "misconduct" disqualification.2° 
Neither of these reasons is persuasive, with the court apparently attempting 
merely to rationalize its result. A holding that, in the context of a labor 
misconduct set forth in this case. E.g., Cassar v. Employment Security Comm'n, 343 
Mich. 380, 406, 72 N.W.2d 254, 258 (1955); IA CCH UNEMPLOYMENT INS, REP. ,I 1970 
(1961). 
10 Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, supra note 9. 
11 MICH. CoMP. LAws § 421.29 (Supp. 1956). 
12 lA CCH UNEMPLOYMENT !Ns. REP. 1J 1970 (1961). 
13 Ibid. 
14 IA CCH UNEMPLOYMENT INS. REP. 1J 1980 (1961). 
15 Principal case at 420, 110 N.W.2d at 919. 
16 IA CCH UNEMPLOYMENT !NS. REP. 1J 1970 (1961); 5 CCH UNEMPLOYMENT INS. REP. 
,I 1970 (1958). 
17 Cassar v. Employment Security Comm'n, 343 Mich. 380, 72 N.W.2d 254 (1955). 
18 Linski v. Employment Security Comm'n, 358 Mich. 239, 99 N.W.2d 582 (1959). 
19 Id. at 244, 99 N.'W.2d at 585. This would seem to imply that an employer's 
wrongful acts might justify what would otherwise be misconduct on the part of the 
employee. See Jones, The Conflict Between Collective Bargaining and Unemployment 
Insurance, 28 RoCKY MT. L. REv. 185, 203 (1956). 
20 Linski v. Employment Security Comm'n, 358 Mich. 239, 245, 99 N.W .2d 582, 586 
(1959). 
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dispute, the "labor disputes" provision applies unless "misconduct" is 
shown, while at the same time refusing to determine, in such a situation, 
whether an employee's acts constitute "misconduct," is tantamount to a 
predetermination that there was no "misconduct." Moreover, the fact that a 
penalty for breach of the agreement had already been provided for by the 
parties seemingly has no relevance to a determination of whether the 
legislature meant a particular disqualification provision to apply or not. 
Using these rationalizations for support, however, the court, in so con-
struing the two disqualification provisions, has essentially made them mu-
tually exclusive when applied to normal conduct by employees involved 
in a labor dispute,21 arguably by reading into the statute something which 
was probably never intended since the objectives of the two provisions 
would appear to be quite different. "Misconduct" disqualifications were 
designed to prevent individuals from taking advantage of unemployment 
compensation benefits when their unemployment has resulted from their 
own wrongful actions.22 "Labor disputes" disqualifications, on the other 
hand, were designed primarily to preserve the neutrality of the state in 
labor disputes by preventing unemployment compensation, insofar as pos-
sible, from being an operative factor in the causation and prolongaton of 
labor disputes.23 And this provision was probably never meant to apply 
to discharge, but only to the voluntary and temporary absence from work 
normally associated with certain labor dispute activities.24 
It is highly doubtful that the Michigan court would hold that the 
"misconduct" provision could never be applicable to an employee involved 
in a labor dispute since it is easy to visualize situations where the employee's 
conduct would be so flagrant as to necessitate such a finding.25 The reason 
why the line has been drawn so as to exclude from consideration the type 
of breach of a collective bargaining agreement found in the principal case 
is, however, not clear. Courts in other jurisdictions having the same or 
21 "(\\']here there is in the same statute a specific provision, and also a general one 
which in its most comprehensive sense would include matters embraced in the former, 
the particular provision must control, and the general provision must be taken to affect 
only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the 
particular provision." Linski v. Employment Security Comm'n, supra note 20, at 244-45, 
99 N.W.2d at 585. 
22 IA CCH UNEMPLOYMENT INS. REP. 11 1963 (1961). 
23 Other theories advanced to explain the "labor disputes" provision are: (1) The 
statute is designed to compensate for involuntary unemployment only and the unemploy• 
ment occasioned by a labor dispute is voluntary. (2) There are serious financial dangers 
involved in undertaking to compensate large masses of workers in something so actu-
arially unpredictable as a strike. Williams, The Labor Dispute Disqualification-A 
Primer and Some Problems, 8 VAND. L. REv. 338, 354 (1955). 
24 The "misconduct" provision speaks of "discharge" whereas the "labor disputes" 
provision speaks only of an employee's total or partial unemployment for the weeks his 
unemployment is due to a stoppage of work. MICH. CoMP. LAws § 421.29 (Supp. 1956). 
25 Linski v. Employment Security Comm'n, 358 Mich. 239, 245, 99 N.W.2d 582, 586 
(1959). 
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similar prov1S1ons in their unemployment compensation acts have not 
agreed with this construction by the Michigan court.26 The differences 
might be the result of differing judicial conceptions of the ultimate pur-
pose of unemployment compensation benefits in the social and legislative 
scheme of the state. The more welfare-oriented this purpose is deemed to 
be, the less likely that a court will invoke the more severe "misconduct" 
provision in other than extreme instances.27 A more limited, and possibly 
more satisfactory explanation, however, might be found in the particular 
court's conception of the nature of a collective bargaining agreement. A 
court which construes such an agreement as something less binding than 
an ordinary contract and as made primarily for the benefit of the em-
ployees28 would probably take a more lenient view of a breach by an em-
ployee than a court which considers such an agreement to be a standard 
contractual arrangement which is equally binding on all parties.20 It is 
unlikely that the majority of the Michigan court would go so far as to 
hold that a person who breaches his contract is not a wrongdoer or that 
such action would not ordinarily constitute "misconduct."30 To do so 
would be to accept a historically interesting but generally rejected view of 
the nature of a contract.31 It is more likely that the court considers a 
breach of contract less significant in a labor dispute setting, or that a 
breach of a collective bargaining agreement is not as serious as the breach 
of an ordinary contract. In either case, unemployment compensation rights 
should not be made dependent on the results of a bargaining process. 
The humanitarian and economic purposes of unemployment insurance too 
26 See, e.g., Progress Mfg. Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 195 
Pa. Super. llO, 169 A.2d 567 (1961). 
27 The Michigan court appears to be quite "welfare oriented." "These benefits are 
designed to run not only to the benefit of claimants but, also, to the benefit of any wives 
and children they may have and to the benefit of the public generally." Principal case 
at 418, 110 N.W.2d at 919. 
28 A court might come to this conclusion by analogizing the agreement to a third-
party beneficiary contract; Howlett, Contract Rights of the Individual Employee as 
Against the Employer, 8 LAB. L.J. 316, 319 (1957); or to a trust for the benefit of the 
employees; Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MICH. L. 
REv. 1, 20 (1958); or merely to a list of restrictions on management action; Tracy, Panel 
Discussion; The Nature of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, in COLLECTIVE BARGAIN· 
ING AND THE LAW 156 (Univ. of Mich. Law School 1959). 
29 This view is generally arrived at by construing the agreement as being, in essence, 
two bilateral contracts, one between the union and the employer and the other between 
the employee and the employer which incorporates the former. Cox, supra note 28, at 19. 
30 But see Cassar v. Employment Security Comm'n, 343 Mich. 380, 390, 72 N.W.2d 
254, 265 (1955) (Smith, J. dissenting). 
31 The view that the duty not to breach a contract means merely a prediction that 
one must pay damages if he doesn't and that no moral significance is attached to a 
breach was strongly advocated in Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 
462 (1897). Its implications have been vigorously questioned and contested. See WlLLIS• 
TON, CoNTRAcrs § 1357 (rev. ed. 1937). See also Bauer, Consequential Damages in Con-
tract, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 696 (1932). 
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often conflict with the practical business aspects of collective bargaining.32 
·whatever the underlying factors of the court's decision, the negative 
implications far outweigh any ostensible advantages. One of the most 
important benefits which an employer derives from a collective bargaining 
agreement is the promise that the union and its members will follow 
certain grievance procedures, usually including arbitration, instead of 
staging a walkout.33 If these procedures are not followed, an employer 
may generally discharge the breaching workers as a matter of contract 
right.34 This decision by the Michigan court renders this remedy somewhat 
nugatory. The employer may still exercise his right to discharge, but if 
he does so, he must continue, at least partially, to support the discharged 
workers. Such result is arguably not consistent with the purposes of the 
Employment Security Act. Disqualification provisions were introduced 
into such acts to insure that an employer was chargeable only when he was 
responsible for an employee's unemployment,35 and was not to be held 
financially responsible if the employee was properly discharged for wrongful 
conduct. To determine who is responsible in a particular case requires an 
examination of the facts and circumstances. An employer should not be 
penalized because a court is unwilling to do this. Rather, the employee, 
or, in a given situation, his union, who created the situation by failing to 
follow the procedure for determination of fault which is provided for in 
the collective bargaining agreement, should be made to bear any financial 
burdens resulting from such actions. 
L. R. Bishop 
32 Jones, The Conflict Between Collective Bargaining and Unemployment Insurance, 
28 ROCKY MT. L. R.Ev. 185, 194 (1956). 
33 CCH, UNION CONTRACT CLAUSES ,J 51,551 (1954). 
34 CCH, UNION CONTRACT CLAUSES ,J 51,701 (1954). 
35 Larson &: Murray, The Development of Unemployment Insurance in the United 
States, 8 VAND. L. REV. 181, 216 (1955). 
